Inflation in India

Just as I post this the inflation rate in India has climbed to a three year high of 7.31%. While economists argue that inflation is a sometimes inevtiable consequence in an economy, which is burdened with several crippling economic tumours, while at the same time yearning for growth rates as high as 9%+. In fact, real growth rates have exceeded 8% on occasion over the last few years.

Ironically, the rising inflation sucks out the purchasing power of the poorest sections of the populace - negating or even reversing the real income increases over the last few years for this section.

India's Reserve Bank has been cautious as usual on this matter. On the one hand , the rising rupee against the dollar has put severe strain on the export industries, including the globally competitive IT sector - and the governement is being lobbied hard not to let the rupee strengthen further. However this just might be the only way to keep a tab on the inflation - and the government should hopefully bit the bullet this time - since inflation is likely to be a big issue in the forthcoming general election.

This article is from the Apr 10th edition of the Economist. It does discuss many of the above points in its usual incisive-but-dismissive-and-condescending style. The article is available online here.

The Indian government's knee-jerk response to inflation is as worrying as the rising prices


IN COLONIAL times, the Coronation Building in old Delhi was one of the city's most prestigious hotels. Today, it is home to a commodity-futures market. But you would not know it. The Rajdhani Oil and Oilseeds Exchange is hidden among a cluster of small shops and peopled by men in kurta pyjamas, their hair dyed with henna, reclining in the afternoon heat under rusted fans. Over an ageing intercom, they take orders to buy and sell mustard seed and jaggery for delivery one or two months hence. The day's opening and closing prices are chalked on a blackboard.

The blackboard shows that prices of the two commodities have fallen in recent weeks. This will come as a relief to India's policymakers, who are frantically seeking to suppress a nasty bout of commodity-price inflation. On April 4th the Ministry of Commerce and Industry revealed that wholesale-price inflation, the measure most closely watched by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the central bank, rose to 7% in the 12 months to March 22nd, its highest rate since December 2004. This price pressure is worrying. But the government's panicked response to it is even more so.


Behind the jump in inflation were higher prices for fuel, food (including edible oils) and metals. The price of iron ore leapt by 46%. This has spooked the government, which faces elections in several big states as well as a national poll before next spring. In response, it has cut import duties on edible oils and banned the export of pulses and rice (except for basmati rice). It even briefly banned the export of edible oils, such as coconut oil, much to the chagrin of Keralite emigrants to the Gulf, who swear by the stuff to keep their hair black and their joints flexible.

Steelmakers in particular have felt the sharp edge of the government's resolve. The Steel Authority of India (SAIL), a state-owned steelmaker, boasts that “there's a little bit of SAIL in everybody's life”, a slogan that runs above pictures of metal bridges, pipes, jugs and even dog-food bowls. After prices rose by more than 20% in the first three months of the year, everybody's life became a bit dearer. Carmakers and scooter-makers protested to the government. Dog-owners no doubt joined them in spirit.

The government threatened to add steel to its list of 15 “essential commodities”, which would allow it to dictate the production and distribution of the alloy. In response, steelmakers “voluntarily” agreed to cut the prices of steel bars used in construction and the corrugated sheets that poor households use for roofing. But steelmakers complain that they are merely passing on the rising costs of coke and iron ore. They fear being caught between “the two prongs of a pincer”, according to the Indian Steel Alliance, an industry group.

Commodity traders, such as the ones reclining in the Coronation Building, fear they may be next in line. Last year the government banned futures trading in two types of bean, rice and wheat, arguing that speculators were driving up prices, beyond what the fundamentals would dictate. Some in the leftist parties, on whose support the government relies, now argue it should extend the ban to other commodities, such as edible oils and perhaps even iron and steel.

This would be like “shooting the messenger”, argues B.C. Khatua, chairman of the Forward Markets Commission, which regulates futures exchanges. Before they were shut down, he points out, the futures markets conveyed the message that prices of wheat and rice would continue to rise. Sure enough, that is what happened.


Banning futures trading would do little to curb prices, especially for commodities like edible oils that are heavily imported. But it would arrest the development of India's financial system, which is finally growing more sophisticated. Since 2003, the government has allowed trading in future contracts for many commodities. One of the two main exchanges, the Multi Commodity Exchange, averages volumes of over $3 billion a day. The Rajdhani exchange turns over about $20m a month.

Great hopes for such markets were expressed this week in a report by a ten-man committee on financial-sector reform, appointed by the planning commission, and led by Raghuram Rajan, now of the Chicago Graduate School of Business, and formerly chief economist of the IMF. It laments “the knee-jerk reaction to ban [markets] or intervene in them whenever they send unpleasant messages.”

The futures market provides farmers with a sneak preview of the prices they will face in the months ahead, which should allow them to make an informed decision about what to sow. In principle, futures contracts should also allow farmers to lock in a price for their crops, insulating them from the vagaries of the spot market. At the moment, farmers are too small to participate in the market directly. But Mr Rajan's report suggests that small banks could aggregate the demands of farmers up to a practical size.

“Just as it is counter-intuitive to steer in the direction of the skid”, Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University once wrote, “it is difficult to persuade the layman” that the best solution to scarcity is a market price, which encourages supply and discourages demand. As Bajrang Lal Goyal, a trader who joined the Rajdhani exchange 40 years ago, points out, India's winter crop is just days away from hitting the market. If the politicians who bash the futures market could be bothered to look at the message it is conveying, they would see that the prices of several sensitive commodities are already on their way down. Just in time, that is, for the elections.

India's economy :What's holding India back?

From the Economist Print Edition here.

This week, the cover story on the economist is how the India 'bubble' is going to deflate (though not burst) soon, largely because of the government's lack of commitment to sesrious reform.
Mar 6th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Failure to reform a bloated civil service is putting the country's huge economic achievements at risk.

“THE tiger is under grave threat,” India's finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, intoned at one point in his budget speech on February 29th. He was referring to the stripy animals that prowl the country in declining numbers. But India's tigerish economy, which has grown by 9% a year on average over the past three years, is itself under threat.

In many ways India counts as one of liberalisation's greatest success stories. For years, it pottered along, weighed down by the regulations that made up the licence raj, producing only a feeble “Hindu” rate of growth. But over the past 15 years it has been transformed into a far more powerful beast. Its companies have become worldbeaters. Without India's strength, the world economy would have had far less to boast about.


Sadly, this achievement is more fragile than it looks. Many things restrain India's economy, from a government that depends on Communist support to the caste system, power cuts and rigid labour laws. But an enduring constraint is even more awkward: a state that makes a big claim on a poor country's resources but then uses them badly.
The state's cage

It is not unusual for a country's bureaucrats and politicians to be less efficient than its businesspeople; and the Indian civil servant, with his forms in triplicate, has been a caricature for so long that it is easy to forget the impossibility of many of the jobs involved (see article). But India's 10m-strong civil service is the size of a small country, and its unreformed public sector is a huge barrier to two things a growing population needs. The first is a faster rate of sustainable growth: the government's debts and its infrastructure failings set a lower-than-necessary speed-limit for the economy. The second is to spread the fruits of a growing economy to India's poor. By the government's own admission, most development spending fails to reach its intended recipients. This is bound to stir up resentment—and risks causing a backlash against business.

Like his prime minister, Manmohan Singh, Mr Chidambaram is by instinct a liberal and a reformer. He is remembered for his “dream budget” of 1997, which cut both taxes and tariffs—and helped spur today's boom. The new budget is his government's final one before it calls a fresh election, probably later this year. He gave an assured performance, doling out money freely and leaving voters appeased, opposition parties stumped and bondholders unruffled (see article). But the budget also confirmed several sad truths about how little reform the government has made during the good years.

Take the public finances. The government is predicting a budget deficit of 3.1% for the current fiscal year and 2.5% next. But these numbers are artificially low. They omit the states' deficits and also most of the cost of fertiliser and fuel subsidies (which all told add another 3.5% of GDP). Other big emerging markets have been less complacent, leaving India in the worst fiscal shape of the lot.

If growth slows, so will tax collection—and India's vigour may be ebbing already. Growth of 9% now looks more like a cyclical peak than a permanent achievement: bottlenecks throughout the economy mean it cannot go faster without setting off inflation. The effects of overheating became clear in an inflationary scare early last year. Growth has since slowed a tad, to 8.4% in the year to the fourth quarter, thanks partly to the intervention of a nervous central bank. India cannot absorb a lot more foreign capital without worrying about stockmarket turbulence or the strength of the rupee. Much of the foreign money it has attracted has gone into inflating share prices or just accumulated unproductively in foreign reserves.

The government's other boast is to have fostered “inclusive growth”. In his budget, Mr Chidambaram duly handed out extra money to a long list of worthy schemes, from school meals to rural road-building. But as he himself conceded, outlays and outcomes are not the same thing. Standing between the two is an administrative machine corroded by apathy and corruption. The government's subsidies fail to reach the poor, its schools fail to teach them and its rural clinics fail to treat them.

Mr Singh made administrative reform a priority when he took office in 2004, and he duly set up a commission to look into it. But even the finance minister admits that most of its deliberations have been academic. The civil service is expected shortly to be awarded a huge pay rise, which will be swiftly embraced, along with tougher performance standards, which will be studiously ignored. One indication of officials' resistance to change is Mr Chidambaram's new proposal to erase the debts of 30m small farmers. This loan waiver may be costly (over 1% of GDP) and crude, but it has one big virtue: it transfers money to relatively poor people at the stroke of a pen, bypassing the cumbersome machinery of the state.
Unleash peepul power

Reform has not completely petered out. The government has called for more independent scrutiny of public programmes and better monitoring of the money it hands out to some 1,000 schemes. It also plans to experiment with “smart cards” for the poor that could cut out bureaucratic middlemen. But administrative reform needs to go deeper than this—if only to prevent the public sector throttling economic growth.

The government's debt burden leaves it short of money for infrastructure. It is reluctant to free banks, pension funds and insurers to serve the market better, because it needs them to buy its bonds. The miserable record of its social spending deprives firms of well-nourished, well-schooled workers, and saps the political will for reform. State governments are left scrabbling to appease rural disgruntlement rather than investing in efforts to lift the productivity of land and labour.

The tiger may be the animal most Indians associate with their private sector; but a more apt symbol is the peepul (sacred fig) tree. Revered by many Indians, the peepul has a habit of making room for itself, poking up through roads, sometimes smothering its rivals. India's dynamic private sector has shown a similar skill. But if the next government again flunks reform, it could be the peepul itself that is smothered.

Asia, The US Slowdown and the "Decoupling" Phenomenon.

A post from the latest Economist Magazine...Just to restart this blog after a long hiatus.
The piece talks about how Asia is going to be resilient to the (now largely recognized as very real) US Slowdown. However let me add that given the way the stock markets all over Asia have been sliding over the last couple of days, the Economist's view seems to have found few takers.
The article is here.

Next stop Asia?
Asia should withstand a knock from an American recession


INVESTORS in Asian stockmarkets were until recently big fans of the “decoupling” theory: the notion that Asian economies can shrug off an American recession. This week’s plunge in shares, taking the MSCI Emerging Asia Index down by 25% at one point from its October high, suggests they have changed their minds. But the fact that Asian markets have not decoupled does not necessarily mean that their economies will follow America's over a cliff.

Decoupling was always a misnomer, seeming to imply that an American recession would have no impact on Asia. In fact exports and hence profits would certainly be reduced. The pertinent argument is that they would be hurt by much less than in previous American downturns.

As well as hitting exports, America’s troubles could affect Asia through various financial channels. Asia’s exposure to the subprime mess is thought to be much smaller than that of American or European banks. Even so, Chinese bank shares tumbled this week on rumours that they would have to make much bigger write-downs on their holdings of American subprime securities. And if stockmarkets slide further as global investors flee from risky assets, this could dampen business and consumer confidence in the region.

Some Asian economies are more vulnerable than others: Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia have exports to America equivalent to 20% or more of their GDPs, compared with only 8% in China and 2% in India. There are already some ominous signs. Singapore’s exports to America are down by 11% over the past year, while Malaysia’s fell by 16%. Exports to other emerging economies and to the European Union surged, so total exports still grew by 6% in both economies. But that was much slower than at the start of the year, and the worry now is that demand from Europe has started to flag.

The growth in China’s exports to America slowed to only 1% (in yuan terms) in the year to December from over 20% in late 2006. So far the impact on GDP growth has been modest. Figures on China’s fourth-quarter GDP are to be published on Thursday January 24th and most economists expect growth to slow to a still healthy 9-10% this year.

China’s economy would probably still expand by around 8-9% even if export growth dried up. During the 2001 American recession China’s GDP barely slowed. In contrast, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia suffered full-blown recessions. America’s recession this time is likely to be deeper than in 2001 and Asia is now more integrated into the global economy. Doomsters conclude, therefore, that these economies could be hit harder this time.

The main reason to be more optimistic is that domestic demand (consumer spending and investment) is likely to remain strong and governments have more flexibility. Last year, despite a slowdown in America’s imports, most Asian economies grew faster as domestic demand speeded up. Robert Prior-Wandesforde, an economist at HSBC, says that those who argue that Asian economies can not decouple from America are ignoring the fact that they already have. Take Malaysia: exports to America plunged, yet its GDP growth quickened from 5.7% at the end of 2006 to 6.7% in the third quarter of last year.

Contrary to the popular view that Asia's meltdown in 2001 was entirely due to a slump in exports, Peter Redwood, at Barclays Capital, argues that a fall in investment played a bigger role. Firms had too much debt and excess capacity, particularly in the electronics sector, which was at the heart of the American recession. Today firms are in much better shape. Capacity utilisation is high across the region; outside China investment as a share of GDP is low by historical standards; corporate balance-sheets are stronger and real interest-rates are low. Firms are therefore much less likely to slash investment than in 2001.

Macroeconomic fundamentals are also much healthier in East Asia. Large foreign-exchange reserves make countries less vulnerable to foreign shocks. Budgets are in surplus or close to balance, giving policymakers more room for a fiscal stimulus to support growth.

Thus even if Asia’s exports clearly have not decoupled from America, its economies will be hurt less than in the past. Standard Chartered forecasts that emerging Asia will grow by an average of 6.4% in 2008, down from 7.8% in 2007. In 2001 growth dropped by three percentage points to 4.2%. Financial markets were slow to realise that Asian growth and hence the profits of some companies would be dented by an American downturn. But now they risk exaggerating the damage. Economic decoupling is not a myth.