Worse will Come.

As ever the Economist remains steadily anti-Indo-US nuclear deal. But in this post, the justification and reasoning given is interesting.


FOR India's government, despite the hubbub in Parliament and barely veiled threats from its neighbour, Pakistan, the controversial deal it struck last month with America to allow civil nuclear co-operation between the two countries is already radiating success. Shinzo Abe, Japan's prime minister, was in Delhi this week to cement a “strategic partnership”, despite Japan's decades-long discomfort with India's bomb. Meanwhile, Australia's cabinet, hitherto resolute in its refusal to sell uranium to any country outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (and only to a select few within it), has taken its cue from America and agreed in principle to sell uranium to India, even though India hasn't signed the NPT, and won't.

India is breaking out of the nuclear quarantine imposed after its first “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974. But for commerce to resume, it must first agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which safeguards will apply to nuclear facilities it has designated “civilian”. It will then need an exemption from the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which bars nuclear trade with countries, such as India, that refuse to apply such international safeguards to all their nuclear facilities. Some governments are deeply unhappy at carving an India-sized hole in the nuclear rules. But none has yet vetoed it.

Unlike North Korea and Iran, which signed the NPT and then violated its rules, India (like Pakistan and Israel) never signed the treaty; its bombs are not illegal. Since no one expects it to give them up, the Bush administration argues it is better to bring India in from the cold and have it take on similar responsibilities to the treaty's five recognised nuclear powers: America, Britain, France, Russia and China. That, say the Americans, would be a net gain for non-proliferation.

This newspaper has long disputed that. Among other dangerous loopholes, some of which have widened since Congress gave its conditional go-ahead to the deal in December, India is pointedly not taking on the obligations and practices of the official five. Unlike them, it has refused to sign the test-ban treaty. Unlike them, it declines to end the production of fissile material—uranium and plutonium—for bombs.

America's readiness to make an Indian exception to all the rules risks snapping two of the joists that support the global non-proliferation structure. At the IAEA, India wants the right not just to say which reactors can be inspected, but when. Such unprecedented laxity in India will make it hard to get others—for example, Brazil, which already does some uranium enriching of its own—to accept the tougher inspections that the IAEA wants as standard for all NPT members.

Likewise, the hard-won clarity of the NSG's trade ban has helped maintain support for the NPT, despite the cheating antics of a few. Mere talk of fudging the rules last year encouraged Russia to break them, citing spurious “safety” concerns as an excuse to sell India uranium fuel. China, unhappy at America's coddling of India, is exploring more nuclear co-operation with Pakistan—which in turn threatens to match India, should it step up weapons production or test again.
Sending precisely the wrong message

Japan, the NPT member with the most capable nuclear industry outside the nuclear five, has told Iran and others that they should do as it does—scrupulously observe all IAEA safeguards—if they want to be trusted with nuclear technology. Exemptions for India will convey a different message: first get your bomb. Such rule-bending puts at risk the anti-nuclear regime that everyone else's safety and security is built on. Governments at the NSG and the IAEA that are unhappy with this need to find the courage of their convictions, and block it.